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LAND USE LAW-PROPERTY RIGHTS: LOST AND FOUND: EMINENT
DOMAIN V. POLICE POWER-Annicelli v. Town of South Kingstown,
_. R.I. _, 463 A.2d 133 (1983).
General propositions do not decide concrete cases. The decision
will depend on judgment or intuition more subtle than any articu
late major premise.
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES 1841
1935
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76
(1905).

I.

INTRODUCTION

"DISCOVER RHODE ISLAND" proudly challenged the license
plates of that state a few years ago. In the decade of the 1970's, many
out-of-state residents did just that. A beach home building boom ad
vanced on the "Ocean State,"! limited only by an occasional economic
recession during which mortgage money became unavailable for sec
ond home construction.
The mere sale of building lots did not have a detrimental effect on
the environment. When new property owners broke ground, however,
the antagonistic interests of two groups rose to the surface. One
town's attempt to deal with the conflicts is the subject of this note.
Annicelli v. Town of South Kingstown 2 exemplifies the Rhode Is
land Supreme Court's attempt to resolve the problem of a landowner's
right to develop property. Ida Annicelli, a New Yorker, bought an
oceanfront building lot. Her attempt to secure a building permit failed
because of a zoning ordinance amendment 3 which prohibited the con
struction of overnight dwellings, such as a single-family home, in a
newly-designated high flood danger zone (HFD). She challenged the
I. The phrase currently appears on Rhode Island license plates.
2. Annicelli v. Town of South Kingstown, _ R.I. - ' 463 A.2d 133 (1983).
3. Appendix for Appellee at Exhibit F, Annicelli, South Kingstown Zoning Amend
ment of May 29, 1975, E (14.53) Uses and Structures Prohibited Within the HFD Zoning
District:
No residential dwelling designed or used for overnight human occupancy shall be
constructed within the HFD Zoning District as defined herein. This prohibition
shall apply even if the land . . . is above the base flood elevation.
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amendment as unconstitutional, denying her the rights guaranteed by
the 5th and 14th Amendments,4 and denounced its passage as an
abuse of the town's police power.
The Town of South Kingstown presented a strong case for out
lawing buildings on the fragile dunes where their location would be a
threat to the living organisms in the salt water ponds on one side, and
a danger to the inhabitants, who would be exposed to the vicissitudes
of the open sea,5 on the other.
The Supreme Court of Rhode Island was forced to balance the
constitutional rights of the individual property owner with the power
of a municipal government to regulate activities in the public interest
or welfare. 6 The town claimed that the ordinance correctly expressed
the council's duty under a government's police power7 to make regula
tions to protect the safety, health, and welfare of its people. Mrs. An
nicelli claimed that, because she had lost all beneficial use of the small
plot, the town should have exercised its power of eminent domainS and
4. See infra notes 31-32.
5. See infra note 17.
6. 6 P. NICHOLS, LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN, § 6.16[2] at §§ 6-104, 6-105 (J.
Sachman rev. 3d ed. Supp. 1980). Nichols refers to the balancing as a recent trend.
7. E. FREUND, THE POLICE POWER, § 3 (1904, reprinted 1976):
From the mass of decisions, in which the nature of the power has been dis
cussed, and its application either conceded or denied, it is possible to evolve at
least two main attributes . . . which differentiate the police power . . . it aims
directly to secure and promote the public welfare, and it does so by restraint and
compulsion . . . not as a fixed quantity, but as the expression of social, economic
and political conditions.
Under the police power, rights of property are impaired not because they
become useful or necessary to the public, or because some public advantage can
be gained by disregarding them, but because their free exercise is believed to be
detrimental to public interests; it may be said that the state takes property by
eminent domain because it is useful to the public, and under the police power
because it is harmful. . . . Id. at § 51 \.
.
8. 6 P. NICHOLS, LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN, § 601[1] at 6-10, 6-12 [hereinafter
cited as Nichols]:
The taking of property by eminent domain was undoubtedly what was in the
minds of the framers of the bill of rights . . . when they declared that private
property should not be taken for public use without just compensation. . . . It is
well settled that a taking of property within the meaning of the Constitution may
be accomplished without formally divesting the owner of his title to the property
or of any interest therein. Any substantial interference with the free use and
enjoyment of property constitutes a taking within the meaning of the constitu
tional provision.
Constitutional rights rest on substance, not on form and the liability to pay
compensation for property taken cannot be evaded by leaving title in the owner,
while depriving him of the beneficial use of the property. . . . However, just how
severe the interference. . . must be to constitute a taking, . . . is not a question
which can be answered in such a way to furnish a concise rule readily applicable
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condemned the land for the use and enjoyment of the general public.
A condemnation action requires that compensation be paid to the
landowner. Since South Kingstown did not compensate her, Mrs. An
nicelli claimed a right to compensation under the theory of inverse
condemnation. 9
One might have expected the Supreme Court of Rhode Island to
sustain South Kingstown's ordinance, the passage of which was in
tended to sustain the area's unique ecological status. Indeed, this im
portant environmental goal has found much support in case law and
scholarly comment. 10 The Supreme Court of Rhode Island, however,
affirmed without dissent, the lower court's finding of a confiscatory
taking. I I
This article will present the background of Annice/li and the cases
from which each party drew support. This note will then make some
predictions as to which landowners will probably lose their challenges
to zoning ordinances. It will also show Annice/li's effect on other own
ers, both indirectly and directly.12
The impact is already being felt. Annicelli was granted a hearing
to determine fair market value of the property instead of the building
permit she sought. \3 That sounds like the end of the story, but stories
have introductions, developments, climaxes, and conclusions. An
nicelli is a climax.
II.

BACKGROUND

The Annice/li14 case, which matched a Rhode Island property
owner against a town and its zoning ordinances, started in May 1975
when Ida Annicelli l5 signed a sales agreement to purchase an ocean
front building lot l6 at Green Hill Beach for $16,750.
The three-quarter acre plot was situated on what defendants
to all cases likely to arise. Each case must be decided on its own merits until, by
the gradual process of judicial exclusion and inclusion, it is possible to say on
which side of the line any given inquiry to private property rights may. . . fall.
Jd. at 6-15 (footnotes omitted).
9. See infra note 46.
10. See infra notes 17-19 and accompanying text.
II. Annicelli, _ R.l. at _, 463 A.2d at 134.
12. See infra notes 151-153 and accompanying text for subsequent zoning changes.
13. Annicelli, _ R.l. at _, 463 A.2d at 141.
14. Jd.
IS. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 7, note 4, Annicelli. Mrs. An
nicelli's husband, an environmental engineer and lawyer "is in fact the beneficial owner of
the property."
16. Brief for Appellee at 21, Annicelli. The property has ocean frontage of about 75
feet and a depth of 80 feet, abutting a planned roadway.

966

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 7:963

termed a "barrier beach"17 with dunes protecting not only salt water
ponds, but also inland areas and residences beyond the pond.
What happened to Annicelli's application for a building permit
does not surprise one when it is viewed in context with the record of
past events. Long a resort area with seasonal homes, Green Hill has a
history of being ravaged by storms and suffered the full force of hurri
canes in 1938 18 and in 1954. 19 The latter, "Hurricane Carol," was as
catastrophic to beach property as the earlier one and prompted the
town to amend its zoning ordinance to create a "beach danger zone."
The amendment prohibited all development along Green Hill's ocean
front and designated the land a conservation area. 20
17. Brief for Natural Defense Council, Inc., Conservation Law Foundation of Rhode
Island, Ecology Action for Rhode Island, Save the Bay, Inc., League of Women Voters of
Rhode Island at 70, (interpreting Coastal Resources Center, University of Rhode Island,
Rhode Island's Coastal Natural Areas: Priorities for Protection and Management 13
(1975)), Annicelli.
A barrier beach complex consists basically of the beach, dune ridge, back
barrier area or lowlands, and a bay/or coastal pond. Each plays a role in dissipat
ing the energy of a storm or hurricane. The porous, sandy beach has the capacity
to absorb great amounts of water as waves rush over the barrier. The dunes ab
sorb the major impact of waves. A storm's energy is further absorbed by the back
barrier areas and wetlands which sponge up floodwater that would otherwise
flood upland areas. By the time a storm reaches the mainland behind the bay or
pond, its energy and impact has been significantly lessened.
Barrier beaches, in their undeveloped state, are the mainland's first line of
defense against storms-absorbing the impact and sparing the mainland commu
nities and harbors from destruction. As the term "barrier" suggests, the primary
function of a barrier beach is to protect other areas from the direct attack of the
open ocean.
Id. (quoting from National Park Service Cooperative Research Unit. University ofMassachu
setts, BARRIER ISLANDS HANDBOOK (1979)). See also Table of Authorities, iv.
18. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae at 16, Annicelli. The storm swept all
existing houses from the beach. Forty-eight people died and property damage amounted to
two and a half million dollars.
Appellee's expert real estate witness testified that property damage in 1938 substan
tially resulted from unsuitable construction and that properly constructed dwellings sur
vived both hurricanes. Further, he testified that deaths in 1938 were caused by inadequate
warnings of the impending storm. Brief for Appellee at 19, Annicelli.
19. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 17, Annicelli. No deaths oc
curred because of increased efficiency in predicting and tracking hurricanes. Early storm
warnings had reduced loss of life, but limited escape routes might have become flooded and
impassable. Also expressed was concern about the danger to rescuers and the strain on
services if police were forced to man roadblocks to prevent looting.
Annicelli commented that "numerous buildings in the downtown Providence area [in
dicate] the height to which floodwaters rose in that area during those same hurricanes and
yet the City of Providence would be laughed at if it tried to prohibit building in that area."
Brief for Appellee at 19, Annicelli.
20. Brief of Natural Resourct:S Defense Council, Inc., Conservation Law Foundation
of Rhode Island, Ecology Action for Rhode Island, Save the Bay, Inc., League of Women
Voters of Rhode Island as Amicus Curiae at p. 15 note 16, Annicelli.
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Construction began anew after a 1966 amendment passed which
allowed residential development again. Impetus for building came
from the federal government's National Flood Insurance program. 21
Much housing construction was taking place in the general area, but
when new homes began appearing on the dunes, local residents pro
tested. Several town meetings brought together bewildered, angry new
landowners, who were anxious to start construction of vacation homes
for personal and investment purposes, and frustrated, confused town
residents, who saw potential harm from the trend, which could pro
duce a hundred cottages on the mile and a half strip.22
21. Id. Encouragement was based on 42 U.S.C. § 4002:
(a) The Congress finds that
(I) annual losses throughout the Nation from floods . . . are increasing at
an alarming rate. . . as a result of the accelerating development. . . .
(5)

the Nation cannot afford. . . the increasing losses of property suffered
by flood victims . . . .
(b) The purpose of this Act, therefore, is to--
(I) substantially increase the limits of coverage authorized under the Na
tional flood insurance program.
22. NARRAGANSElT TIMES, June 15, 1972, at I, col. I.
A mysteriously conceived proposal to ban construction of houses on Green Hill
Barrier Beach-at least temporarily-produced a bitter confrontation Monday
night between the South Kingstown Town Council and area property owners
before being defeated, 3-2.
Many of the landowners complained that they spent thousands of dollars to buy
property in the area, and that any building ban by the council would make their
lots virtually worthless.
Some people said they learned of the proposal only an hour or so before meeting
time and had to rush to town hall, many from out of town, to defend their sum
mer property.
The council. . . appeared to disavow any knowledge of how the proposed ban on
building was placed on the Monday agenda . . .
From 1954 to 1966 the area in question was zoned as a flood danger section, and
buildings for overnight occupancy were prohibited there.
But for reasons no one has yet satisfactorily explained, the Flood Danger zoning
was dropped in 1966 when the town adopted an updated zoning ordinance, and
so in recent years home building in the area has been legal again.
Id. Aug. 10, 1972 at I, col. 2-4:
600 Watch Green Hill Case Unfold Over 5 Hours
What the town will do . . . is a question which has . . . attracted regional and
even nationwide attention . . . .
The crowd included television and radio reporters, news photographers, and writ
ers from several newspapers, giving the proceedings an air of importance seldom
achieved at any zoning hearing on the municipal level. . . .
Id., Sept. 14, 1972 at 5, col. 3-6:
After Weekend Scuffie. Green Hill Case Topic of Meeting Tuesday
Divergence of opinion resulted in a scuffle at the beach last Saturday when an
argument broke out between 25 protest marchers opposed to further building
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In 1972 the Rhode Island Coastal Resources Management Coun
cil,23 concerned about the unsuitable development of the state's barrier
beaches, initiated a moratorium on further building until it could
study the possible impact and recommend guidelines for construc
tion.24 The Council published two reports on Rhode Island's barrier
beaches and in May 1973 prepared a land use plan which included
Green Hill and raised serious questions about the appropriateness of
further construction. 25
On May 29, 1975, South Kingstown amended its zoning regula
tions. The town again prohibited residential dwellings in what became
labeled a "high flood danger zone" (HFD).26 One year later the town
passed another amendment which revised the entire 1966 Ordinance
and restated the establishment of an HFD zone. 27
Annicelli completed the purchase of the property on October 24,
1974, after the restrictive zoning ordinance had been enacted. The
purchase agreement provided that she would assume responsibility for
obtaining "all necessary building, sanitation, and coastal resources
permits."28 She promptly applied to the town building inspector for a
there and a property owner. One man alleged that he was bitten on the hand and
another was scratched. . . incident pointed out how deep emotions are running.
23. 1971 R.I. PUB. LAWS, ch. 279, § 1, as amended § 46-23-1:
Legislative Findings-Creation.
The general assembly recognizes that the coastal resources of Rhode Island, a
rich variety of natural, commercial, industrial, recreational, and aesthetic assets
are of immediate and potential value to the present and future development of
this state; that unplanned or poorly planned development of this basic natural
environment has already damaged or destroyed . . . the state's coastal resources,
. . . that it shall be the policy of this state to preserve, protect, develop, and
where possible, restore the coastal resources of the state for this and succeeding
generations through comprehensive and coordinated long-range planning and
management. . . . these policies are necessary to protect the public health, safety
and general welfare. . . . can be best achieved through the creation of a coastal
resources management council as the principal mechanism for management of the
state's coastal resources.
24. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 5, Annicelli.
25. Id. Reports described Green Hill Pond as a highly productive coastal pond be
hind the dunes, serving as a nursery area for finfish, a spawning area for winter flounder, a
growing area for blue and green crabs, and one of few estuaries in the state supporting
oyster production.
The study explained "eutrophication," a process by which growth of algae and similar
plants increases due to the addition of certain nutrients to the pond from such sources as
driveway runoffs, septic systems, and fertilizers. The study concluded that Green Hill
Pond had exceeded its capacity to handle additional nutrients. Id. at 6, note 2.
26. See supra note 3.
27. Brief for Appellee at 1, Annicelli.
28. Annicelli, _ R.1. at _, 463 A.2d at 135.

1985j

PROPERTY RIGHTS

969

single-family dwelling permit 29 and to the Rhode Island Department
of Health for an individual sewage-disposal system. She received ap
proval for the latter, but did not for the former as the amendment
prohibited the proposed use. 30
On January 15, 1976, Annicelli filed an action in superior court
for a declaratory judgment. She contended that the amendment creat
ing a HFD zone on May 29, 1975, was unconstitutional on its face,
violating provisions of the fifth and fourteenth amendments 3! to the
United States Constitution,32 and article I, section 16, of the Constitu
tion of the State of Rhode Island. 33
The Superior Court of Rhode Island, sitting without a jury, tried
the case on June 15, 1977, and did not hand down a decision until
October 9, 1980. The court did not pass on the constitutionality of the
zoning amendments, but did determine that as applied to Annicelli's
lot, the amendment effectively confiscated private property resulting in
an indirect taking for the public benefit without compensation. 34
South Kingstown appealed to the Supreme Court of Rhode Is
land, including two other issues resolved earlier in Annicelli's favor. 35
29. Brief for Defendant at I, Annicelli. Application was made on November 19,
1975.
30. Annicelli, _ R.I. at - ' 463 A.2d at 135. In addition, there were permitted uses
by special exception which included:
[Sjingle beach cabanas, raising of animals, raising of crops, horticultural nursery
or greenhouse, bathing beach, golf course, camp for boys and girls, marina,
lunchroom or restaurant without entertainment or alcoholic beverages, commer
cial dock or pier, storage, repair or sales of boat accessories, commercial parking,
vehicle storage, utility substation or pumping station, manufacture. . . of boats,
any accessory use customarily incident to a use permitted as a special exception in
the zoning district.
31. Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae at 28, note 21, Annicelli. South
Kingstown denied her the due process and equal protection guarantees of the fourteenth
amendment, Annicelli claimed, because property outside the HFD, unburdened by the
building restrictions, might pollute Green Hill Pond.
32. U.S. CONST. art. V: "[NJor shall private property be taken for public use, with
out just compensation."
art. XIV: "[Njor shall any State deprive any person of . . . property, without due
process of law; . . ."
The 5th amendment prohibition applies to individual states through the 14th amend
ment. Chicago B. & Q.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 239 (1897).
33. R.I. CONST. art. 1,016: "Private property shall not be taken for public uses,
without just compensation."
34. Ida Annicelli v. Town of South Kingstown, C.A. No. 76-7, Superior Court at 12
(1980).
35. Brief for Defendant at 4, Annicelli. First, the town had declared that Annicelli's
petition for a declaratory judgment should have been dismissed because she had not ex
hausted the administrative remedies available to her when the building inspector initially
denied her a building permit. The town said she should have appealed to the Zoning Board
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ANALYSIS

The Police Power Rejected

The Supreme Court of Rhode Island faced the

ba~ic

issue in An-

of Review. Title 54-24-16 and Section 20 of the General Laws of Rhode Island provide for
appeals to the Board of Review from decisions of the Building Inspector. South Kingstown
has its own zoning enabling act which is Chapter 101 of the Public Laws of January, 1973.
Section 18 thereof was amended March 24, 1976 by Chapter 11 of the Public Laws of
January 1976, and gave the local Zoning Board of Review similar powers.
Mrs. Annicelli did not appeal the denial to the Zoning Board of Review. not only
because the single family dwelling permit she requested represented a prohibited use in the
HFD zone, even as a special exception, but also because the Zoning Board of Review had
no power to grant ordinance variances. Annicelli contended that Nardi v. City of Provi
dence, 89 R.I. 437, 153 A.2d 136 (1959) on which the town relied, did not apply. Brieffor
Defendant at 4-11, Annicelli. In 1925, Nardi purchased property located almost entirely in
a business district. The municipality repealed the 1923 zoning in 1951, changing the land
use to general residence and rendering 20,000 square feet commercially useless. Nardi said
the reclassification violated his constitutional rights. The court held that mere enactment
of the ordinance did not affect the property. Until he applied for a permit or relief by
exception or variance, no actual controversy existed between the City of Providence and
him on which a declaratory decree could issue.
Annicelli argued that Frank Ansuini, Inc. v. City of Cranston, 107 R.I. 63, 264 A.2d
910 (1970) controlled. In Ansuini, Cranston denied a residential developer approval for a
residential plat because he would not donate seven percent of the land to the town for
recreational purposes, as required by a 1965 zoning ordinance. He did not appeal to the
Board of Review, but sought a declaratory judgment that the ordinance was invalid. The
court declared the seven percent figure arbitrary and unconstitutional. It also recognized
that the Board of Review, a municipal agency, had no authority to declare a regulation null
and void. No reason existed, therefore, for Ansuini "to do that which would be futile." Id.
at 73, 916. The court, reviewing the facts of Annicelli, concurred.
Another obstacle comprised South Kingstown's claim that Annicelli did not have
standing to sue because the town passed the zoning ordinance in question between the
signing of the sales agreement and the actual conveyance.
The contract theory explained in 6 CORBIN, CONTRACTS, § 1361 at 492 (1962), led to
the conclusion that the risk of restrictions in ordinances should be passed on to the pur
chaser. The purchase agreement made no provision for recission of the contract in the
event of a zoning change, so Annicelli had standing as the equitable or beneficial owner of
the land. Annicelli, _ R.I. - ' 463 A.2d at 238.
Equitable conversion is that constructive alteration in the nature or charac
ter of property whereby, in equity, real estate is for certain purposes considered as
personalty, or whereby personalty, for similar considerations, is regarded as real
estate, and in either instance, it is deemed to be transmissible and descendible in
its converted form. The doctrine of equitable conversion was adopted for the
purpose of giving effect to the intention of the. . . contracting parties, and is not
a fixed rule of law but proceeds on equitable principles that take into account the
result to be accomplished. It is a mere fiction, resting on the principle that equity
regards things which are directed to be done as having actually been done where
nothing has intervened which ought to prevent performance. It merely means
that where there is a mandate to sell property at a future date or to employ money
for the purchase of land . . . [the] land, though not actually sold, may be treated
as money, or money, though not actually paid out in the purchase of land, may be
treated as land.
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nicelli vs. Town ofSouth Kingstown 36 of whether, in restricting uses of
oceanfront land, the town had properly exercised its police power; i.e.,
to protect the health, safety, and welfare of the public. If not, the
ordinance constituted an indirect, confiscatory taking of Annicelli's
property without the just compensation required by eminent
domain.37
South Kingstown presented evidence that tended to show that the
zoning restrictions met the standard set in Goldstein v. Zoning Board
of Warwick,38 which specified that limitations on property uses must
have a reasonable relationship to public health, safety, morals, and
27 AM. JUR. 2d Equitable Conversion § I (footnotes omitted).
Where an equitable conversion is effected by an executory contract for the
sale of land, the vendee is considered in equity as the trustee of the purchase price
for the vendor, and the vendor, in tum, is regarded as holding the legal title in
trust for the purchaser and as security for the purchase price. The vendee's inter
est under the contract is considered to be realty, and he is deemed to be the
equitable owner of the property. On the other hand, the vendor's interest under
the contract is considered to be personalty, he is deemed the owner of the
purchase money, with an equitable lien on the property for the balance of the
unpaid purchase price.
27 AM. JUR. 2d Equitable Conversion § II (footnotes omitted).
36. _ R.I. - ' 463 A.2d 133. The town contended that the zoning amendments
represented a proper exercise of the police power and did not deprive plaintiff of all benefi
cial use of the property.
37. Nichols, infra note 8.
It is fundamental that the power to appropriate private property for public
use is an attribute of sovereignty and is essential to the existence of government.
The power of eminent domain does not depend for its existence on a specific grant
in the Constitution; it is inherent in sovereignty and exists in a sovereign state
without any recognition thereof in the Constitution. It is founded on the law of
necessity. The provisions found in most of the state constitutions relating to the
taking of property for the public use do not by implication grant the power to the
government of the state, but limit a power which would otherwise be without
limit. . . .
The power of eminent domain is inalienable, and no legislature can bind it
self or its successors not to exercise this power when public necessity and conven
ience require it. . . .
27 AM. JUR. 2d § 2 (footnotes omitted).
38. 101 R.1. 728, 731, 227 A.2d 195, 197 (1967) (petitioners owned land in a residen
tial section, bounded on one side by a Howard Johnson restaurant and very near a large
shopping complex. The town had denied them a variance to build a gas station on 2/3 of
the plat. Evidence tended to prove the commercial nature of the surrounding property.
Attempts to dispose of the property for residential purposes had proved fruitless. The city
failed to present evidence that a gas station would depreciate land values and increase traf
fic. It gave no reason for denying the permit. Petitioners were allowed to build.
See also, Sundlun v. Zoning Board of Review of City of Pawtucket, 50 R.1. 108, 145 A.
451 (1929). The Board of Review of Pawtucket denied Sundlun a special exception to the
zoning ordinances to construct a gasoline station in a residential district under a compre
hensive plan to secure safety, to promote health, to lessen congestion in the streets, and
accomplish other purposes. In reversing the denial, the Rhode Island Supreme Court
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general welfare. The town pointed to the number of uses allowed or
made possible by exception. 39
The town suggested further that the situation could be likened to
that of Sipson v. State,40 which involved filling a marshland. There,
the court upheld a theory that denial of a permit to alter a marshland
did not deprive the owner of a use. The owner would still own the
same marsh with the same value. Similarly, Annicelli would still have
all the uses usually associated with a beach. The town supported its
suggestion with an oft-quoted comment in Just v. Marinette County 41
that "an owner of land has no absolute and unlimited right to change
the essential natural character of his land as to use it for a purpose for
which it was unsuited in its natural state and which injures the rights
of others."42
Courts have taken divergent views as to the possible uses required
to sustain a finding of "taking" of property. Some courts require close
scrutiny because the denial of a zoning permit may have been caused
by the failure of landowners to meet their burden of showing that no
beneficial use remained for them. 43
noted that the neighborhood had changed in character so that "it would appear that the
neighborhood has very little privacy to be invaded." Id. at 116, 145 A. at 454.
Many residents had organized to block approval and the court said that "[p]ublic
notice of the hearing. . . is not given for the purpose of polling the neighborhood on the
question involved." Id. at 117, 145 A. at 455.
39. See supra note 30.
40. 115 N.H. 124, 336 A.2d 239 (1975). Plaintiffs had already filled in two acres
legally and built and sold a house for a sizable profit in 1972 before new regulations halted
additional filling.
41. 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972). Marinette County passed shoreland zon
ing in 1967 under a comprehensive plan to protect navigable waters and public rights from
deterioration which would result from uncontrolled development.
The Justs purchased 36.4 acres with over 1000 feet of lake frontage before the new
ordinance placed the land in a conservancy district. They had sold some parcels before the
change. Later the Justs filled a large section without securing a conditional-use permit.
42. Also supportive of the view was Candlestick Prop., Inc. v. San Francisco Bay C
& D Com'n, 11 Cal. App. 3d 557, 89 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1970). Plaintiff was the owner of a
$40,000 parcel of land which became submerged at high tide by the waters of San Francisco
Bay. He took advantage of tidal changes to dispose of debris from inland construction
projects. In upholding the police power to regulate the bay, the court pointed out that
"resting on past conditions . . . [does] not cover and control present day conditions." Id.
at 571, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 905. See also, Spiegle v. Beach Haven, 46 N.J. 479, 218 A.2d 129
(1966). The New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed a lower court decision that an ordinance
prohibiting construction on the ocean side of an established building line constituted a
reasonable exercise of police power. In Spiegle, plaintiffs had built houses on two of their
four parcels which, therefore, would not be affected.
43. Maple Leaf Investors v. State of Washington, 88 Wash. 2d 726, 565 P.2d 1162
(1977) (cited by defendants as a case similar to AnnicellI). Petitioners, 10 shareholders,
purchased property in 1965 to develop a single-family residential tract. Seventy percent lay
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Annicelli did not depend heavily on the issue of the reduction of
property value, although both parties agreed that some diminution of
value had occurred. An oceanfront building lot in a developing area
constitutes a valuable parcel. A plot with dune grass, on which one
could construct a boardwalk to gain access to the ocean for swimming,
fishing, or sunbathing, would not entice an ordinary buyer. Defend
ants attempted to defuse the issue by citing cases in which a munici
pality exercised the police power constitutionally to deprive
landowners of most of their land's value. 44
within the Cedar River Flood Control Zone, a designation made by legislative enactment in
1935 because recurring damage threatened the public health and safety. The Supreme
Court of Washington sustained Washington's use of police power, noting that petitioners
had notice from the time of purchase that the property might be subject to some restric
tions. The owners offered no persuasive testimony that they could not make a profitable
use of the property.
Brecciaroli v. Connecticut Comm'r of Env. Protec., 168 Conn. 349, 362 A.2d 948
(1975). Plaintiff owned 20.6 acres ofland abutting a river in Guilford. Seventeen and one
half acres were subsequently designated as tidal wetland. An application to place 4 feet of
clean fill on 5.3 acres was denied. Brecciaroli was the first case alleging an unconstitutional
taking of land without compensation heard by the court under the state's act to preserve
wetlands and tidal marshes. Influenced by the language of the Environmental Protection
Act of 1971 that the air, water and other natural resources are a public trust, the court
could not sayan unconstitutional taking had occurred merely because one specific use was
denied. Id. at 357, 952.
44. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) Owners could not
obtain a $3,000,000 annual lease which would allow a United Kingdom corporation to
construct a multi-story office building over Grand Central Terminal. South Kingstown
analogized Penn Central to Annicelli. Grand Central Terminal was designated a landmark
under New York City's Landmarks Preservation Law which was enacted "to protect his
toric landmarks neighborhoods from precipitate decisions to destroy or fundamentally alter
their character." The owner of such a designated landmark must get approval before exte
rior alterations are made.
In Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 405 (1915) Petitioner purchased eight acres
in 1902 because of a very valuable bed of clay used to manufacture fine quality bricks on
the premises. Excavations rendered the $800,000 parcel unsuitable for residential purposes.
An ordinance enjoined petitioner's further use of the land for brickmaking, reducing the
value to $60,000. The city had built up around the location and residents complained of
discomfort and sickness from smoke, soot, and cinders.
The Supreme Court, in affirmation, found the ordinance a good faith police measure.
"There must be progress, and if in its march private interests are in the way they must yield
to the good of the community." Id. at 410.
Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887). Courts and commentators still quote Mugler
for the proposition that "[t]he exercise of the police power by destruction of property which
is itself a public nuisance, or the prohibition of its use in a particular way, whereby its value
becomes depreciated, is very different from taking property for public use, or from depriv
ing a person of his property without due process of law."
Mugler, in 1887, built a brewery to manufacture beer at a cost of $10,000. The state of
Kansas passed an ordinance in 1880 prohibiting the manufacture and sale of intoxicating
liquors, except for medical, scientific, and mechanical purposes. The appellee charged that
the statute violated his constitutional rights to due process and equal protection of law.
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The Supreme Court of Rhode Island sustained the lower court's
ruling that South Kingstown had taken Annicelli's property for the
benefit of the community45 and vacated an order to issue a building
permit. "Annicelli has in fact established an action in inverse condem
nation 46 against the town and thus must be compensated for a con
struction 'taking.' "47
In reaching its conclusion, the court engaged in the traditional
balancing of the conflicting aims of the public's welfare and the land
owner's right to use her property as she pleased. 48 The balance neces
sitated an assessment of the degree of damage done to the property
owner. 49 The court also considered whether the "best use" doctrine
should be applied; that is, that confiscation does not occur merely be
cause landowners cannot put land to the use most desirable or profita
ble to them. 50
In the instant case the court adjudged the zoning ordinance to
have denied all beneficial use of the property to Annicelli since only a
much larger tract could take advantage of the exceptions. In other
The court held that if a state passes such legislation for the peace and security of society,
the courts cannot, without "usurping legislative functions, override the will of the people as
thus expressed by their legislature." Id. at 662. See a/so, Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S.
590 (1962) (ordinance halted a 38 acre sand and gravel operation because the the town
viewed the huge crater that had been created as a safety hazard); Euclid v. Ambler Realty
Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926) (changing industrial designation of 68 acres was reasonable
to meet changing conditions).
45. Annicelli, _ R.1. _, 463 A.2d at 135.
46. 27 AM. JUR. 2d 478 (footnote omitted):
'Inverse condemnation' has been characterized as an action or eminent do
main proceeding initiated by the property owner rather than the condemnor, and
has been deemed to be available where property has been actually taken for public
use without formal condemnation proceedings and where it appears that there is
no intention or Willingness of the taker to bring such proceedings. It has also
been deemed to be available where property is taken for a public purpose by a
municipality or other agency having the power of eminent domain under circum
stances such that no procedure provided by statute affords an applicable or ade
quate remedy to the owner to obtain just compensation for his property in
accordance with his constitutional right thereto.
47. Annicelli, _ R.1. at - ' 463 A.2d at 135.
48. Id. at - ' 463 A.2d at 139.
49. Id. at - ' 463 A.2d at 140 (quoting Just v. Marinette County, 56 W. 27, 201
N.W.2d 761, 767 (1972».
50. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980), serves as an example of property
owners not being able to choose the "best use" of their properties. Appellants acquired five
acres of unimproved land in Tiburon, California; the lot possessed a spectacular view of
San Francisco Bay and a panorama of other scenic surroundings. A zoning ordinance
placed the property in a classification with density limitations. A California court upheld
the town's right to limit five acres of prime residential real estate to the construction of one
to five houses, holding that a limitation on the best use was not a confiscation.
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words, the court found suggested uses illusory for the fifty foot wide
lot, which does not, in fact, reach the pond. 51
The decision paralleled similar cases in other states. 52 The cases
drew a fine distinction between protective action required by a govern
mental unit under its police power to protect its citizens from harm
and a regulation passed to benefit the public good. The latter requires
51. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Annicelli at 26, note 19. "[T]he
Town's planner testified that the land might be used . . . for . . . commercial dock (on
Green Hill Pond), marina. . . restroom. . . . Others testified that the land could possibly
be used to grow beach grass, which was a good economic crop in high demand to stablize
dunes . . . ."
52. See State v. Johnson, 265 A.2d 711 (Me. 1970). Appellants owned a long strip of
land across salt water marshes in the town of Wells, protected by the Maine Wetlands Act.
Although the land flooded at high tide, it could be adapted for building if the grading were
changed. A single justice while recognizing that the land was part of the state's valuable
natural resources noted that without fill, the land had no value whatever to the owners.
The court held "on the facts peculiar to the case" that "to leave appellants with commer
cially valueless land. . . . is to charge them with more than their just share of the cost of
this state-wide conservation program, granting fully its commendable purpose." Id. at 716.
Another case favorable to Annicelli was Dooley v. Town Plan and Zoning Com'r, 151
Conn. 304, 197 A.2d 770 (1964). Fairfield created a flood plain district in 1961 which
prohibited excavation or fill on about 404 acres of land, previously zoned residential, a half
mile from the ocean. Builders' plans were underway. Permitted uses similar to those in the
instant case included park, playground, marina, wildlife sanctuary, gardening, and re
stricted parking, precluding the landowner from getting a reasonable return on his prop
erty. Id. at 306, 197 A.2d at 771. Morris County Land Improvement Co. v. The Township
of Parsippany-Troy Hills, 40 N.J. 539, 193 A.2d 232 (1963) was also supportive. Plaintiff
owned 66 acres which consisted of a top layer of wet, unstable, brown muck and peat on
the surface, a second stratum of from two to four feet of highly compressible clay and silt,
and a bottom layer of sand and gravel. In order to support structures, the top two layers
would have had to be removed and replaced with suitable fill; thus the area had remained
unused. Plaintiff operated a sand and gravel business: he could no longer fill his land with
excess material from his industrial operation after a new ordinance forbade any dumping.
The court held that the ordinance, enacted to prevent private productive use and to main
tain the natural state of the land, was invalid. Id. at 543, 193 A.2d at 235. The court also
took note of MacGibbon v. Board of Appeals of Duxbury, 347 Mass. 690, 200 N.E.2d 254
(1964). Plaintiff owned seven acres of land, parts of which became flooded once or twice a
month. A zoning amendment in 1960 restricted the filling of any marshland, wetland, or
bog without proper authorization from the Board of Appeals, which twice denied MacGib
bon permits to fill or excavate. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts directed the
Board of Appeals to hold further proceedings, explaining the reason for its denial to the
plaintiff.
It appears that the board, acting under the guise of zoning, intends to grant no
special permits for any physical changes and improvements on any coastal wet
lands in the town and thereby to protect and preserve them in their natural state.
The preservation of privately owned land in its natural, unspoiled state for the
enjoyment and benefit of the public by preventing the owner from using it for any
practical purpose is not within the scope and limits of any power or authority
delegated to municipalities under the Zoning Enabling Act.
MacGibbon v. Board of Appeals of Duxbury, 356 Mass. 635, 640-41, 255 N.E.2d 347. 351
(1970).
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that just compensation be paid to the property owner under the power
of eminent domain. Testimony and the actual wording of the South
Kingstown ordinance revealed a strong environmental goal of conserv
ing open spaces and natural resources, a goal which would benefit the
public good. 53
Courts often quote Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes' comments in
Penn. Coal Co. v. Mahon,54 when judicial action requires discriminat
ing between the government's power to protect from harm and to gain
a public benefit. He cautioned that the fifth amendment protection of
private property seems so absolute that a tendency can develop
whereby governments try to mold the facts to justify the use of police
power regulation. "[A]t last . . . private property disappears."55
Holmes issued a warning which courts have heeded for over fifty
years:
Weare in danger of forgetting that a strong public desire to improve
the public condition is not enough to warrant achieving the desire
by a shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying for the
change. As we have already said, this is a question of degree-and
therefore cannot be disposed of by general propositions. 56

B.

The State of the Law

The Supreme Court of Rhode Island had to decide whether the
South Kingstown zoning ordinance was unconstitutional on its face,
unconstitutional as applied to the Annicelli property, or a valid regula
tion to protect and preserve a community's natural assets. 57
53. Annicelli, _ R.1. at _, 463 A.2d at 140.
54. 260 U.S. 393 (1922). The Mahons contracted to purchase only the surface rights
of land, while anthracite coal was to be mined below. Liability on the part of the coal
company for damages was waived, reflected in the low price. The Mahons later attacked
that contract. Id. at 405.
The coal company argued that the Mahons should repair damage to their house
caused by depressions in the land, fill lawn and sidewalks, and if necessary, move out until
the company completed mining coal because the lot had no right of support. Justice
Holmes concluded that if private persons took the risk of acquiring only surface rights, the
danger they suffered should not give them greater rights than they had purchased. The
Mahons should not acquire a right of support by their house without paying for it.
55. Id. at 415.
56. Id. at 416.
57. The barrier beach is a beautiful and unique natural resource in its undeveloped
state. Most states have no seacoast at all. Others have allowed a variety of construction as
determined by the desires of the particular owners, or of state and local governing bodies.
Although lacking the high rise hotels and condominiums of Florida, or even the profusion
of waterfront motels found on Cape Code, Rhode Island's 40 miles of seacoast has been put
to many other types of development.
The mansions gracing Newport's coastline occupy one end of the spectrum. Other
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Taking

A threshold problem involves the definition of "taking." Ben
tham's social utilitarian theory58 posited that property represents "a
basis of expectations" founded on existing rules and that society likes
to depend on rules. Only a general understanding of a taking exists,
however, and the uncertainty about how individual situations will be
judicially regarded is unsettling. Nichols 59 identified "taking" as a
word to be broadly construed encompassing substantial interference
with private property which lessens its value or the owner's right to its
use or enjoyment. This could happen even though title and possession
remained undisturbed. Van Alstyne edifies the concept in terms of
Constitutional theory.60 The right of a government to "take" property
is not a grant of modern times. 61
development contains oceanfront trailer parks and commercial establishments such as
found in the Matunuck section of South Kingstown. One of these establishments fell vic
tim to the vicious assault of spring storms in 1983 and its kitchen hung precariously over
relentless waves which stole its foundation and still challenge its existence. The area is not
a sheltered cove or bay; it is not stabilized with high elevations or substantial rock forma
tions. It is a fringe of land doing constant battle with the Atlantic Ocean.
Whichever decision the court made, it could point to case law and academic support.
The dilemma involving zoning ordinances in the debate between eminent domain and the
police power has not lacked litigants or literati.
58. Bentham believed that an unpredictable redistribution of property is potentially
destructive of society's weIl being. Michelman, Property and Fairness: Comments on the
Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1212 (1968)
[hereinafter cited as Michelman].
59. 2 P. NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN § 6.3 (3d ed. 1964).
60. Van Alstyne, Taking or Damaging By Police Power: The Search For Inverse Con
demnation Criteria, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. I, 33 (1971) (hereinafter cited as Van Alstyne).
"[A] legislative measure which so restricts the use of property that it cannot be used for any
reasonable purpose goes . . . beyond regulation and must be recognized as a taking of
property. "
61. Note, Just Compensation or Just Invalidation: The Availability of a Damages
Remedy In Challenging Land Use Regulations, 29 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 711, 712 n. 11 (1982)
(quoting F. BOSSELMAN, D. CALLIES, & J. BANTA, THE TAKING ISSUE 56 (1973)) [herein
after cited as Damages]:
The right of the sovereign to 'take' property by judicial process goes back at least
some seven and a half centuries. Section 39 of the original Magna Carta (1215)
provided that '[n]o freeman shall be . . . deprived of his freehold . . . unless by
the lawful judgment of his peers and by the law of the land'.
One writer says that the term "taking" appears to cause substantial confusion to some
courts, based on its incorrect interpretation in the weIl-known Pennsylvania Coal case.
Note, Eldridge v. City of Palo Alto: Aberration or New Direction in Land Use Law? 28
HASTINGS L.J. 1569, 1603 (1977). The Pennsylvania Coal Court stated that "if a regula
tion goes too far it will be recognized as a taking." Later courts used the language to order
compensation as a remedy. The writer urges it was a figure of speech merely indicating
that a regulation was invalid. Id. at 1575 (interpreting Penn. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S.
393,415 (1922)).
See also Fred F. French Investing Co. v. City of New York, 39 N.Y.2d 587, 350
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The Supreme Court has stated the need to focus on the character
of the action and extent of the interferences with rights in the parcel as
a whole. 62
Courts have considered the issue on a case-by-case basis, an ap
proach not always favored. Friedman sanctions the criterion of fair
ness,63 but does not seriously disagree with other writers.64 Even if a
uniform standard of fairness were accepted, the many factual situa
tions would individualize its application.
2.

Police Power

If the court does not find a taking then laws, regulations, and
ordinances in question represent valid exercises of a governmental en
tity's police power. 65 Regulations are presumed to be constitutionally
valid until shown to be arbitrary and unreasonable with no substantial
N.E.2d 381, 385 (1976). The court referred to Pennsylvania Coal's use of "taking" as only
a metaphor rather than an indication that the case involved questions of eminent domain
and just compensation. The court cited other cases as well.
62. Penn. Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. at 130-31.
63. M. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM, 7-36 (1962) reprinted in Eco
NOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF PROPERTY LAW 77 at 103 (1975). Friedman abandons his for
mer position favoring case-by-case adjudication of compensability cases for a test
responsive to society's purpose which should be one of fairness.
64. Van Alstyne, supra note 60, at 28-29. Van Alstyne refers to a rational basis test
which "accepts judicial responsibility for evaluating the reasonableness of a regulation, as
applied, in light of all the surrounding circumstances."
An attempt to define the reach of police power "or trace its outer limits is fruitless, for
each case must turn on its own facts." Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954).
"The importance of the case-by-case approach was a recurrent theme in the cases
discussed by the Eldridge court." Note, Eldridge v. City of Palo Alto: Aberration or New
Direction in Land Use Law? 8 Hastings L.J. 1569, 1602-05 (1977).
65. The following cases and authors are much quoted in the police power context:
There is no set formula to determine where regulation ends and taking be
gins. . . . The term "police power" connotes the time-tested conceptional limit
of public encroachment upon private interests.
Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962).
As long recognized, some values are enjoyed under an implied limitation and
must yield to the police power. But obviously the implied limitation must have its
limits, or the contract and due process clauses are gone . . . So the question
depends on the particular facts. . . .
Penn. Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,413 (1922).
The acknowledged police power of a State extends often to the destruction of
property. . . . Without attempting to define what are the peculiar subjects or
limits of this power, it may safely be affirmed that every law . . . for the preserva
tion of the public peace, health, and morals must come within this category.
Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 658 (1887).
See also Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (\954); Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272
U.S. 365, 374 (1926); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 410 (1915); Michelman, supra
note 58 at 100; and Van Alstyne, supra note 60, at 27-28.
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relationship to safety, health, and welfare. 66 The presumption allows
some discretion to a court to discern a different "true purpose" for an
ordinance and substitute its own judgment for that of a municipality. 67
A regulating entity may refer to an action however it wishes, but its
appellation is not conclusive to the courts. 68
In many cases the courts have upheld public enactments, includ
ing zoning changes, as necessary to health, safety, and welfare, and
therefore, a proper exercise of police power. In McCarthy v. City of
Manhattan Beach 69 the city rezoned plaintiff's oceanfront land for
beach recreation. A civil engineer defended home construction, but a
judge viewing the site felt reasonable minds could differ on the safety
issue. In City of St. Paul v. Chicago, St. p', M. & 0. Ry. CO.70 the
court approved restrictions of building heights in a downtown revitali
zation project. The United States Supreme Court in Berman v.
Parker 71 affirmed condemnation in an urban renewal project. In Tur
66.

Euclid v. Amber Realty, 272 U.S. 365:
If the municipal council deemed any of the reasons which have been sug
gested [see n.IO], or any other substantial reason, a sufficient reason for adopting
the ordinance in question, it is not the province of the courts to take issue with the
council. We have nothing to do with the question of wisdom or good policy of
municipal ordinances. If they are not satisfying to a majority of the citizens, their
recourse is to the ballot-not the courts.
Id. at 393.
"Traditional courts defer to local legislative judgment for several reasons: the separa
tion of powers, a perceived lack of judicial expertise in land use matters, and the desire to
allow local governmental flexibility in meeting changing conditions. . . ." Mandelker,
Land Use Takings: The Compensation Issue, 8 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 491, 588-89, 593
(1981) (hereinafter cited as Mandelker) (footnote omitted). As long as a municipality as
serts a laudable public purpose for a land use restriction, such as environmental protection,
the traditional court will presume that the restriction is constitutionally valid.
67. Kolis, Citadels 0/ Privilege: Exclusionary Land Use Regulation and the Presump
tion 0/ Constitutional Validity, 8 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 594 (1977).
68. Note, Damages supra note 61 at n. 22 (referring to quotation in Hughes v. Wash
ington, 389 U.S. 290,298 (1967): "[T]he Constitution measures a taking of property not by
what a state says, or by what it intends, but by what it does." (emphasis in original).
69. 41 Cal. 2d 879, 264 P.2d 932 (1953), cert. den. 348 U.S. 817 (1954). The court
noted that prior to 1941, when the property was zoned for residences, plaintiffs, seeking
industrial classification, had argued it could not be used profitably for houses.
70. 413 F.2d 762, 770 (1969). The City forbade structures on the railroad's property
from rising above the level of a park on a bluff above. The court found that the public
benefit exceeded the appellee's loss in market value.
71. 348 U.S. 26 (1954). Congress made a legislative determination that Washington,
D.C. had to correct conditions existing in certain sections. Congress identified slum
houses, many of which were beyond repair and lacked inside toilet facilities, electricity, and
central heating. The Court upheld Congress' conclusion that a need existed to restructure
the entire section as a whole, rather than by piecemeal condemnation of particular build
ings, since the redevelopment plan would integrate parks, schools, churches, recreational
sites, and shopping areas with the construction of new homes.
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ner v. County of Del Norte 72 the court outlawed rebuilding on land
with a history of damaging floods. Despite a severe reduction in value,
the court in HFH, Ltd. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County 73 up
held zoning changes from industrial to agricultural to residential. The
court required an expensive soil study in Kopetzke v. San Mateo Bd. of
Super.74 In Pope v. City of Atlanta 75 the court disallowed a property
owner's construction of a tennis court because its surface would not
absorb water. In San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. San Diego the court
upheld a zoning change from industrial to open spaces but left open
the question of whether compensation would be the proper remedy if
the ordinance were deemed confiscatory.76
3.

Eminent Domain

A property regulation not found to be a proper use of police
power will likely trigger another governmental prerogative-eminent
72. 24 Cal. App. 3d 311, 101 Cal. Rptr. 93 (1972). Turner, owner of 31 acres on a
river bank, received approval for a subdivision which would create 143 building lots, in
cluding roads, a water system, and a model home. In 1964 severe flooding swept away
everything. The city initiated restrictive zoning based on studies of the United States Army
Corps of Engineers. The court found the ordinance "no more stringent than existing dan
ger demands." Id. at 314, 10 1 Cal. Rptr. at 96.
73. 125 Cal. Rptr. 365, 367, 542 P.2d 237, 239 (1975). HFH, a limited partnership,
alleged that its unimproved property could be sold for $400,000 as an industrial parcel, but
only for $75,000 as residential. Plaintiff had had the opportunity to sell previously when
the land was designated industrial.
74. 396 F. Supp. 1004 (1975). The zoning classification placed oceanfront property
in the most unstable soil group and was necessary to assure safety.
75. 242 Ga. 331, 249 S.E.2d 21 (1978). The tract in question bordered a river that
was included within the Metropolitan River Protection Act. The property contained a
home, a man-made lake, and a swimming pool, but the city disapproved a tennis court
because of the cumulative effect such permits would cause.
76. 450 U.S. 621 (1981). The San Diego Gas & Electric Co. acquired a 412 acre
parcel, costing $1,770,000, as a possible site for a nuclear power plant in 1966. The com
pany abandoned the plan after the discovery of an offshore fault affecting its feasibility.
The city rezoned the land to preserve it as a parkland. Funding was not approved, how
ever, so the land remained restrictively zoned. A superior court and the court of appeals
ultimately granted the utility $3 million plus interest in damages in an inverse condemna
tion suit. The California Supreme Court remanded the case for further consideration in
light of the decision in Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980). The Agins holding
established that the exclusive remedy should be invalidation of the regulation and not a
monetary award. Appellant appealed, claiming that property taken for public use required
compensation under the fifth and fourteenth amendments. On retransfer, the court of ap
peals, considering San Diego and relying on Agins, refused compensation, but did not inval
idate the zoning ordinance of the open space plan because of factual disputes in the superior
court record. The United States Supreme Court, on review, interpreted the appellate
court's action as an absence of final jUdgment and dismissed the appeal suggesting that
appellant might seek relief in superior court. Id. at 633. See also supra notes 40-44.

1985]

PROPERTY RIGHTS

981

domain. 77 It places a limitation on the sovereign's right to exercise
power78 and forces the "formality of ordinary condemnation proceed
ings."79 The remedy most often granted in eminent domain cases
comprises an injunction to restrain the unconstitutional invasion. 80
The problem that has resisted resolution is, of course, how to decide
cases that contain elements of improper use of police power and emi
nent domain. 81 Components of each become intermingled and diffi
cult to identify.82 Nichols wanted to focus on taking of property
because of the public's need to use it and utilizing police power to
prevent a use detrimental to public interest."83
Judicial concerns about the validity of a regulation include look
ing at the motive or reasonableness of its effect and being able to judge
its impact. 84 The economic impact represents a factor to measure
against any derivative community benefit,85 along with a consideration
of fairness, consistency, and alternatives. 86
Depreciation in value, of utmost concern to the landowner, im
pacts less on the judiciary. It often reinforces other conclusions about
the uses allowed for the property and is not conclusive standing
alone. 87 Possibly the courts mask its real force by verbalizing more
accepted criteria. 88 In any case, it is an unusual plaintiff who fails to
77. NICHOLS, supra note 8.
78. Cabaniss, Inverse Condemnation in Texas - Exploring the Serbonian Bog, 44 TEX.
L. REV. 1584, 1585 (1966) (footnote omitted) (hereinafter cited as Cabaniss).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1591 (footnote omitted).
81. Id. at 1589. Cabaniss talks about "a gray area where these two competing pow
ers meet at their fringes" and indicates that any "accurate prediction in advance of the
outcome" is "virtually impossible."
82. Id. at 1589 (quoting NETHERTON, CONTROL OF HIGHWAY ACCESS 130 (1963».
Netherton noted that the increased use of both powers has expanded them conceptually
and the differences in law are no longer clearly apparent.
83. 1 P. NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN § 142 (3d ed. 1964).
84. Van Alstyne, supra note 60 at 9. Van Alstyne again discusses reasonableness,
stating that landowners may not be required to prove the physical impossibility of adhering
to the allowable land uses, but rather that a reasonable man would be unlikely to develop
those uses. Id. at 34 (footnote omitted).
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. 1 R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZoNING § 2.22 at 93 (1968). "The preva
lence with which judicial opinions examine comparative valuation data in determining the
validity of land use regulations, however, makes it clear that financial impact may exert a
significant influence on the court's views as to whether the public interest advanced [by the
regulation] is worth the price."
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estimate the 10ss.89
Discerning any meaningful pattern requires careful study of past
decisions in which ordinances were not valid. Arverne Bay Const. Co.
v. Thatcher 90 established that a change in zoning cannot restrict any
reasonable use. The court in Holgate v. Zoning Bd. ofRev. of the City
of Pawtucket 91 said zoning must consider changes in an area. The
motivation behind the municipality's zoning was successfully chal
lenged in Yara Engineering Corp. v. City of Newark.92

89. Van Alstyne, supra note 60 at 13. Land use controls often result in "economic
detriment" that is "directly perceivable, readily describable and conveniently provable."
Other theoretical treatments of the problem exist, one assigning names to the two
divergent views: the "private marketeers" and the "police power enthusiasts." Private
marketeers place maximum emphasis on property rights and would rely on the achieve
ment of community goals through a consensus of the citizens. Police power enthusiasts
believe that a regulation with any public purpose is valid and they wish "to be rid of the
irritant of compensation." Costonis, "Fair" Compensation and the Accommodation Power,
REGULATION V. COMPENSATION IN LAND USE CONTROL 3, 6 (1977) (hereinafter cited as
Costonis).
One writer summarizes factors which are usually part of a case-by-case analysis:
(1) whether or not the public or its agents physically used or occupied some
thing belonging to the claimant; (2) the size of the harm sustained . . . or the
degree to which his affected property has been devolved; (3) whether the claim
ant's loss is or is not outweighed by the public's concomitant gain; (4) whether the
claimant has sustained any loss apart from restriction of his liberty to conduct
some activity considered harmful to other people.
Michelman, supra note 58 at 1183-84.
90. 278 N.Y. 222, 15 N.E.2d 587 (1938). The borough denied application for a gaso
line station variance in a formerly unrestricted zone of Brooklyn which was subsequently
rezoned as residential. The court said the borough could not preserve unimproved proper
ties for the distant future.
91. 74 R.1. 333, 60 A.2d 732 (1948). Denial of a gas station permit found no support
from the court. New residences in the changing area would no longer, in fact, be "in
harmony with the . . . general characteristics of the neighborhood."
92. 132 N.J.L. 370,40 A.2d 559 (1945). Newark attempted to rescind a resolution to
purchase swampland from plaintiff for a municipal airport and then passed a restrictive
ordinance limiting the height of structures and trees in the area, reducing the land's indus
trial value.
See also Bydlen v. United States, 175 F. Supp. 891, 900 (Ct. CI. 1959) (preserving a
wilderness for its aesthetic values is a taking without compensation); Burrows v. City of
Keene, 121 N.H. 590,432 A.2d 15 (1981) (court rejected the method of preserving land by
showing intention to buy, giving low appraisals, and then changing zoning). HFH, Ltd. v.
Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 125 Cal. Rptr., 365, 379, 542 P.2d 237,248 (1975)
(Clark, J., dissenting) (strong dissent reacting to dim'unition of value. Justice Clark took
exception to the majority's narrow view of "damage" as invasion or spoilation. In its ordi
nary sense damage could be applied to an 80 percent decrease in fair market value). Fred
P. French Inv. Co., Inc. v. City of New York, 39 N.Y.2d 587, 350 N.E.2d 381 (1976)
(designating private parks as open to public unacceptable).
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Just Compensation

The U.S. Constitution provides the framework for considering
the issue ofjust compensation. 93 How should a landowner be compen
sated for the "ultimate evil"?94 Eminent domain requires that just
compensation be paid for an action that a governmental unit initi
ated. 95 If a finding results that a taking occurred without formal ac
tion, the landowner takes the legal initiative with an inverse
condemnation suit. 96 The theory sounds simple, but not unexpectedly
the application has led to unhappy results. Regulatory legislation is
sustained because the state can prevent one property owner from caus
ing unreasonable injury to another.97 The dual consideration of the
rights of both parties arguably does not include monetary compensa
tion. 98 There is general agreement that compensation must be made
when the public helps itself to some benefit at private expense, but not
when the public simply wants one of its members to cease being a
nuisance. 99 If the regulation is not allowed to stand, at least as applied
to a particular complainant, the landowner may make demand for
compensation through inverse condemnation. 100 The situation created
a "doctrinal tangle," 101 evidenced by the fact that the Supreme Court's
93. See supra note 32 for the constitutional guarantee.
94. Fred. P. French Inv. Co., Inc. v. City of New York, 39 N.Y.2d 587, 596-97, 350
N.E.2d 381, 387 (1976):
The ultimate evil of a deprivation of property, or better, a frustration of property
rights, under the guise of an exercise of the police power is that it forces the
owner to assume the cost of providing a benefit to the public without recoupment.
There is no attempt to share the cost of the benefit among those benefited, that is,
society at large. Instead, the accident of ownership determines who should bear
the cost . . .
95. Nichols, supra note 8.
96. Id. See also Cabaniss, supra note 78, at 1584-85 (footnote omitted) ... 'Inverse'
connotes that the landowner, not the sovereign institutes the proceedings."
97. Van Alstyne, supra note 60 at 5. "Except in extreme cases many regulations are
accepted as part of the cost of existence in society."
98. Id. "Governmental action under the guide of police power which is claimed to
be arbitrary and confiscatory may be challenged by seeking injunctive or declaratory relief,
or as a defense to enforcement proceedings. . . but does not generally give rise to a cause
of action for compensatory damages." See also DeMello v. Town of Plainville, 170 Conn.
675, 680, 368 A.2d 71, 74 (1976).
99. Michelman, supra note 58 at 1196.
100. Mandelker, supra note 66 at 515. Such a demand in land use taking cases "cer
tainly has intuitive appeal."
101. J. Payne, From the Courts. Just Compensation in a Breadbox, REAL EsTATE
L.J. 264, 269 (1982-83). "It is impossible to extract from state court decisions any coherent
or consistent approach to the question of whether, and under what circumstances, a mone
tary inverse condemnation remedy should be available to property owners challenging zon
ing and other land use regulations. Supra note 61, at 719.
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most liberal members, Justices Brennan and Marshall, occupy oppo
site sides of the payment issues.
Historically, compensation existed within a narrow framework; in
situations in which actual physical invasion of property occurred and
a municipality imposed inequitable zoning actions on land that it
planned to acquire in the future. \02 The latter, referred to as "down
zoning," tended to deflate the compensation a municipality would
have to pay later. \03
In recent years, landowners have urged judicial acceptance of the
inverse condemnation remedy in place of injunctive relief following
successful challenge of land use regulations. 104 Alarm is increasing
about expansion of money damages and support continues for the in
validation of ordinance remedy. Commentators most frequently men
tion the possibility that the threat of paying monetary damages will
cause governments to use more restraint than desirable to effectuate
sound planning decisions. \05 Claims exist that allowing damage
awards falls within the legislative realm. \06 Zoning changes are argua
ble predictable and the purchase price may reflect the impact. \07 Some
102. Note, Eldridge v. City of Palo Alto: Aberration or New Directions in Land Use
Law? 28 HASTINGS L.J.; supra note 61 at 1594-95. See also Eck v. City of Bismarck, 283
N.W.2d 193 (N.D. 1979). Agricultural zoning imposed on 126 acres of residential property
was not appropriately an inverse condemnation action because in every previous state case,
property owners had alleged a taking or damaging from direct physical disturbance.
103. Scott, An Introductory Interpretation, Regulation v. Compensation in Land Use
Control: A Recommended Accommodation, A Critique and an Interpretation, xii (1977).
"[A] down-zoning ordinance nearly always reduces the owner's income or increases his
costs."
"Often the effects of these regulations is to lower the value of the land as the threat of
condemnation hangs over it." Van Alstyne, supra note 60 at 3.
104. Mandelker, supra note 66 at 492.
105. Costonis, supra note 89 at 4. "[The government] can retrench to the police
power by liberalizing the overly restrictive measure, often at the cost, however, of compro
mising the measure's intended . . . result."
"[T]o insist on full compensation to every interest which is disproportionately bur
dened by a social measure dictated by efficiency would be to call a halt to the collective
pursuit of efficiency." Michelman, supra note 58 at 1178.
"If a government entity. . . were held subject to a claim for inverse condemnation
. . . the process of community planning would . . . grind to a halt. Selby Realty Co. v.
City of San Buenaventura, 10 Cal.3d 110, 120,514 P.2d 111, 117, 109 Cal. Rptr. 799, 805
(1973).
"[F]ears have been expressed that compensation allowed too liberally will seriously
impede, if not stop, beneficial public improvements because of the greatly increased cost."
Bacich v. Board of Control, 23 Cal.2d 343, 350, 144 P.2d 818, 820 (1943).
106. Note, Damages supra note 61 at 725.
107. HFH, Ltd. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 125 Cal. Rptr. 365, 374,
542 P.2d 237, 246 (1975). The other side of that argument is that municipalities can pre
dict and plan for compensation during the period in which landowners painstakingly take
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describe the economic hardships as the price of living in an enlight~
ened and progressive community. lOS Those desiring compensation see
it as a method of being returned to the place they would have been 109
"but for" the ordinance. The fight to invalidate a regulation, however,
is often long and expensive. I 10 Some trend watchers hope that the
prospect of paying compensation will interject a positive restraint on
the regulation of private property. 11 I Michelman's provocative opin~
ion bespeaks a need for governmental restraint. "Any measure which
society cannot afford . . . is unwilling to finance under conditions of
full compensation," he warns, "society cannot afford at all."112
In one case,113 the New York Court of Appeals unequivocally
ruled against compensation. In an earlier decision,114 the California
Supreme Court had taken the same stance. The fact that the Supreme
Court of the United States reiterated the California pronouncements
against money damages in neutral fashion led some to believe that our
highest court would sustain all but the most severe ordinances. 115 The
their appeals through proper public agencies and courts. Note, Damages supra note 61 at
731.
108. HFH, Ltd. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 125 Cal. Rptr. 365, 542
P.,2d 237, 242 (1975).
109. Cabaniss, supra note 78 at 1585. "He may enforce his constitutional guarantee
by an inverse-condemnation action to recover not only damages that would have been com
pensable originally, but also [those] that may have been only probable or speculative."
110. For a listing of cases which were lengthy battles, see Note, Damages supra note
61 at 732-34, 753 n.151.
Ill. J. Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149, 160
(1971).
1l2. Michelman, supra note 58 at 1181.
113. Fred P. French Inv. Co., Inc. v. City of New York, 39 N.Y.2d 587, 595, 350
N.E.2d 381, 386 (1976).
[T]his is often the beginnings of confusion, a purported 'regulation' may impose
so onerous a burden on the property regulated that it has, in effect, deprived the
owner of the reasonable income. . . or other private use of his property and thus
has destroyed its economic value. In all but exceptional cases, nevertheless, such
a regulation does not constitute a 'taking' and is therefore not compensable, but
amounts to a deprivation or frustration of property rights without due process of
law and is therefore invalid.
Id.
114. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 263. The U.S. Supreme Court found no
taking and thus did not consider whether the Supreme Court of California's findings were
correct; specifically, it held that "a landowner who challenges the constitutionality of a
zoning ordinance may not sue in 'inverse condemnation' and thereby transmute an exces
sive use of the police power into a lawful taking for which compensation in eminent domain
must be paid." It concluded that mandamus and a declaratory judgment constituted the
sole remedies. Id. at 259.
115. Mandelker, supra note 66 at 503-04. Mandelker interpreted Penn Central and
Agins as evidence of an acceptance of harsh land use restrictions, justified by widely distri~
uted community benefits. He feared that lower courts, following the Supreme Court's lead,
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San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San Diego I 16 may be the heir
apparent to the complexities of the compensation problem. 117
The five to four Supreme Court split in San Diego reflected a ma
jority opinion that the California Court of Appeals had not made a
final judgment on whether the city had taken property without just
compensation.
The highest court deemed it inappropriate, therefore, to consider
the damages question. Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Stewart,
Marshall, and Powell, dissented on the basis that the court of appeals
had indeed made a final decree. I IS The California Supreme Court re
manded the case for a possible retrial on disputed factual issues not
covered previously. Justice Brennan believed the California court had
settled the fifth amendment "taking" issue; 119 the dissenters pointed
out that the conclusion of the court of appeals contradicted Supreme
Court precedent in regard to "takings" because police power regula
tions can destroy use and enjoyment of property for the benefit of the
public as effectively as condemnation of physical invasion of property.
The dissenters argued that de facto exercises of the police power ex
ist.l2O Justice Brennan argued that the California court, therefore,
could not deny just compensation when a municipality used the police
power to take property for public use.
Payment should be made to the landowner from the date of "tak
ing" and end if the ordinance is repealed. 121 A state cannot make a
would have difficulty taking a critical look at a municipality's justifications for its land use
programs and questioned whether the benefits exceeded the burdens.
116. 450 U.S. 621. See also note 76 and accompanying text.
117. Cunningham, Introduction, Land Use Symposium, 8 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
449,450 (1981):
.
[I]t was widely expected (and in some quarters feared) that the case of Agins. . .
the [Supreme] Court's first direct confrontation with compensatory taking in land
regulatory matters would produce significant advancement in this little under
stood but much-discussed area of our law. Those hopes (or fears) were dashed by
the inconclusive result of Agins and the [Hastings Constitutional Law] Quarterly
moved . . . to . . . its heir apparent, San Diego. . . .
118. San Diego Gas & Electric, 450 U.S. at 632. In its conclusory opinion the court
said: "Unlike the person whose property is taken in eminent domain, the individual who is
deprived of his property due to the state's exercise of its police power is not entitled to
compensation . . . the party's remedy is administrative mandamus." Id. at 639.
119. Id. at 642-43, 645-46.
120. Id. at 652. "From the property owner's point of view, it may matter little
whether his land is condemned or flooded, or whether it is restricted by regulation to use in
its natural state, if the effect in both cases is to deprive him of all beneficial use of it."
121. [d. at 653.
It is only fair that the public bear the cost of benefits received during the interim
period between application of the regulation and the government entity's rescis
sion of it. The payment of just compensation seems to place the landowner in the
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policy judgment which would impair constitutional guarantees. 122
The majority in San Diego placed an obstruction in the path of a
solution to the remedies problem. If one recognizes a choice only be
tween compensation or no compensation, the adversaries must stand
unyieldingly on opposite sides of the road,123 unable to modify their
positions. 124 Commentators often advance Brennan's proposal to re
scind the ordinance 125 and pay interim damages for the period during
which the ordinance was in effect. 126 Justice Rehnquist, voting with
the majority on the final judgment issue, agreed with Brennan's dam
ages proposal. Many commentators believe Rehnquist's comments re
ally represent five to four support and that an award of interim
damages may prove to be the arbitration award of the future. 127
same position monetarily as he would have occupied if his property had not been
taken.
Id. at 656-57.
122. Id. at 661.
123. Sax, supra note III at 180-81. Sax feels that "the more useful question, raised
by the . . . present compensation law, is whether it is necessary for every property owner
to have the opportunity to profit from the use of his land as he wishes, and at every given
moment of time."
124.' Van Alstyne, supra note 60 at 70. "Much of the existing law of inverse condem
nation, so far as it relates to claims of excessive use of the police power, exhibits an unfortu
nate tendency to treat relevant issues on an all-or-nothing basis. . . . Yet it is clear that a
complete range of intermediate positions exists between these extremes." Deadlock inevita
bly arises from the competition between the two groups, Costonis states, suggesting that the
stage be enlarged to include another theory-the accommodation power. Accommodation
demands less than just compensation and rests on a standard of "reasonable beneficial use."
Accommodation stresses fair compensation, a compromise between best use of property
and no use. Costonis, supra note 89 at 4, 31, 32-42. "A court, it seems, must choose
between denying all compensation and awarding 'just' compensation; the loss is either a
'taking' of 'property' or it is not. . . . [I]n this framework, we shall not be able to exploit
the substitute ability [of other settlement]." Michelman, supra note 58 at" 1253-54.
125. Beuscher, Some Tentative Notes on the Integration of Police Power and Eminent
Domain by Courts: So Called Inverse or Reverse Condemnation, 1 URBAN LAW ANN. 12
(1968). A municipality faces the problem of whether a governmental unit "can free itself of
liability for just compensation by the simple expedient of repealing or altering the regula
tion." Further, a municipality may be left with an unusable interest in the claimant's land.
Id. at 13.
126. HFH, Ltd. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles COUllty, 125 Cal. Rptr. 365, 378,.
542 P.2d 237, 250 (1975) (Clark J., dissenting). "In the case of an in,valid ordinance, the.
court in issuing mandate should . . . [award] interim damages, costs and attorney's fees."
McMurry discusses the problem, pointing out that an' increasing number of jurisdic
tions recognize interim losses as compensable injuries. Note, Damages, supra note 61 at
734-37.
127. Cunningham, supra note 117, at 539.
No doubt most state courts will accept Justice Brennan's views, as stated in San
Diego, to be the best evidence of the Supreme Court's current interpretation of the
Fourteenth Amendment as applied to regulatory taking cases. Hence no state
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On the Predictability of Annicelli

An analysis of court decisions concerning property rights and
land regulations reveals a consistent attempt to balance competing in
terests. The various tests proposed separately to validate the constitu
tionality of a regulation under the protective shield of the police power
seem capable of molding into one standard. The search for more defi
nite guidelines led experts in the field to find one appropriate word to
express the evaluative process. "Diminution in value" as a solitary
standard frustrated those who looked at "purpose." "Degree of
harm" done by an ordinance gave more latitude to the courts. "In
tent" of the particular regulation lent a relevant focus. Many deci
sions were rendered with a finding of "reasonableness." Some
commentators thought "fairness" more pragmatic. Van Alstyne sug
gested looking at the "cumulative impact,"12S but that need not be the
last word either. Anyone of us could be the affected property owner
with no wish to have our problem viewed narrowly by the constraints
of a one-word appellation. Courts make determinations daily, giving
thoughtful consideration to the health, safety, and general welfare of
the public. 129 To accept a simplistic standard by which to judge a
municipality's ordinances is to discourage the subtle judgment or intu
ition of the court. 130
Annicelli's thread of hope was a slender strand. In Rhode Is
land's earlier decisions, which mirrored the problems of other growing
cities in the East, the courts focused their attention on ordinances
dealing with health and morality. \31 In Annicelli, the court placed recourt will find itself compelled to award the full market value of land as compen
sation whenever a regulatory taking is found.
The possibility of a different damages remedy in a statutory action against local gov
ernments, based on Section 1983, with an inverse condemnation claim should not be over
looked. Note, Damages, supra note 61 at 723-24 (footnotes omitted). "A series of Court
decisions has established that civil rights embrace property interests, that municipal corpo
rations, the primary land use regulators, are 'persons' for Section 1983 purposes, and that
local governments are not immune from damage liability flowing from constitutional
violations ...
128. Van Alstyne, supra note 60 at 37 (referring to the decision in City of Phoenix v.
Burke, 9 Ariz. App. 395,452 P.2d 722 (1969) (emphasis added). "Typically, although the
court discussed each of the variables. . . none was singled out as a controlling feature of
the case; the cumulative impact of all, however, was deemed to support the conclusion that
the restriction in question was unconstitutional."
129. See Freund, supra note 7 and accompanying text.
130. See supra opening quotation.
131. Typical cases were Harrington v. Bd. of Alderman of City of Providence, 38 A.
I (1897) (The court held that the municipality could enjoin landowners under the police
power from maintaining a privy vault on premises once a sewer line abutted the street
because the vaults constituted a menace to comfort and health); Horton v. Old Colony Bill
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liance on cases involving variances granted for the construction of gas
stations in transitional urban areas,132 not an encouraging similarity.
Plaintiffs frequently won the disputes. \33 The arbitrary assignment of
a percentage of developer's land to open spaces was only marginally
analogous. 134 Saving a whole lake from destruction caused by sewage
discharge would be expected,135 yet such a case is tenuous support for
one attempting to build in a flood danger zone near salt water ponds.
A more common ground articulated for setting aside an ordi
nance was a reaction to a municipality's attempt to preserve land in its
natural state for essentially aesthetic reasons,136 which raised the ques
tion of the community's good faith or real intent. \37 In an analytical
framework, only State v. Johnson\38 escapes placement; surprisingly,
the court did not uphold· Maine's Wetland Act forbidding the filling of
coastal marshland. The lesson learned is that municipalities that seek
to keep attractive, undeveloped parcels of land for the enjoyment of
the community, now and for future generations, cannot use the police
power as a shield or guise to keep them.
A second lesson is evident if there is a common denominator in
the cases on which the town of South Kingstown relied. In these deci
sions the courts had not overturned zoning ordinances. Some deci
sions were tied to a community's immediate need to prevent
irreversible damage. 139 Some property owners had to defer to the
city's need for renewal and to keep pace with social changes. l40 The
Posting Co., 90 A. 822 (1914) (An act regulating the location, size, kind, and subject matter
of outdoor billboard advertising was reasonable and highly necessary to protect public
safety, health, morals, and well-being of the city. The billboards provided a frequent source
of disputes, not only for aesthetic reasons but also because their location and structure
provided a place in which immoral activities occurred).
132. Chevron Oil Co. v. Bd. of Appeals of Shelton, 170 Conn. 146, 365 A.2d 387
(1976); see also, cases cited supra note 38.
133. See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text.
134. Frank Ansuini, Inc. v. City of Cranston, 107 R.I. 63, 264 A.2d 910 (1970).
135. Sundell v. Town of New London, 119 N.H. 839,409 A.2d 1315 (1979).
136. Dooley v. Town Planning and Zoning Comm'r, 151 Conn. 304, 197 A.2d 770
(1964); Morris County Land Improvement Co. v. Township of Parsippany-Troy Hills, 40
N.J. 539, 193 A.2d 232 (1963). See also Bydlen v. United States, 175 F. Supp. 891 (Ct. CI.
1959).
137. MacGibbon v. Bd. of Appeals of Duxbury, 347 Mass. 690, 200 N.E.2d 254
(1964). See also San Diego Gas & Electric v. San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981); Burrows v.
City of Keene, 121 N.H. 590,432 A.2d 15 (1981); Yara Engineering Corp. v. City of New
ark, 132 N.J.L. 370, 40 A.2d 559 (1945).
138. 265 A.2d 711 (Me. 1970).
139. Candlestick Prop. Inc. v. San Francisco Bay C & D Comm'n, 11 Cal. App. 3d
557, 89 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1970).
140. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954); City ofSt. Paul v. Chicago, St. P., M. &
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courts recognized the imminent threat of a danger to a landowner 141
as well as the traditional morality or health disputes. 142 Most signifi
cant in the overall picture, however, are decisions in another large cat
egory of complainants who lost. They were the "users," owners who
had used the land for many years before the municipality imposed the
restriction. 143 In addition were owners who might still be able to de
velop part of their land profitably.l44 Some had even deliberately ig
nored the law. 145 Another refinement in cases upholding zoning
regulations was having had the opportunity to make use of land at one
time in the past and failing to do so. 146 To these people, the message
has been: You have had some beneficial use of your holding and there
is no law that says your use can continue forever. One decision, Penn
Central, 147 fits uncomfortably into a category. The architectural pres
ervation of Grand Central Station seems "unfair" and "unreasonable"
as balanced against the corporation's business judgment. The corpo
rate competitive interest in both domestic and international trade
seems as compelling as preventing the construction of one more high
rise building in a city of skyscrapers. The Supreme Court of Rhode
Island may well have thought that leaving Annicelli's narrow strip of
beach to nature preferable, but could not find it appropriate to take the
lot as a compelling necessity for the health and safety of South Kings
town residents. As applied to the particular parcel it is not conclusive
that a dwelling would cause injury to living organisms in the salt pond.
It is speculative to say that her dwelling, if it floated free in a storm,
would go inland and damage someone else's land. Since the court de
cided Annicelli, however, the coastal erosion at that location has
quickened at an alarming pace. Ironically, a similar ordinance,

o.

Ry. Co., 413 F.2d 762 (1969); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 53
N.Y.2d 124,423 N.E.2d 320,440 N.Y.S.2d 843 (1981).
141. Turner v. County of Del Norte, 24 Cal. App. 3d 34, 101 Cal. Rptr. 93 (1972);
McCarthy v. Manhattan Beach, 41 Cal. 2d 879, 264 P.2d 932 (1953), cert. den., 348 U.S.
917 (1954).
142. Kansas v. Mugler, 123 U.S. 623 (1887); DeMello v. Town of Plainville, 170
Conn. 675, 368 A.2d 71 (1976).
143. Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915); Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S.
590 (1962).
144. Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972); Sibson v. State,
115 N.H. 124, 336 A.2d 239 (1975); Spiegle v. Beach Haven, 46 N.J. 479, 218 A.2d 129
(1966); Brecciaroli v. Connecticut Comm'r of Env. Protec., 168 Conn. 349, 362 A.2d 948
(1975). See also Pope v. City of Atlanta, 242 Ga. 331,249 S.E.2d 21 (1978).
145. State v. Capuano, 120 R.L 58, 384 A.2d 610 (1978); Just v. Marinette County,
56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972).
146. HFH, Ltd. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 125 Cal. Rptr. 365, 542
P.2d 237 (1975).
147. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
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pttrased in language more directly aimed at safety than environmental
preservation, is more urgent today than in 1975.
In June 1984, Annicelli was awarded $68,500 compensation. An
nicelli could not have been returned to her former position. A decade
of deliberation prevented that result. The federal government has long
since retracted its grant of flood insurance to new construction in such
zones. The amount of compensation represented the fair market
value. 148
The town's position since the decision has evolved into one which
supporters of intensive zoning feared. 149 Lacking funds to meet simi
lar court challenges in the future,150 the town amended the offending
ordinance l51 to allow single family detached dwellings as special ex
ceptions in a high flood danger zone if they meet specific standards, 152
if owners submit technical and scientific materials,153 and file an Envi
ronmental Impact Statement. 154 The structures must be landward of a
Annicelli at - ' 463 A.2d at 141.
See Costonis, supra, note 105 and accompanying text.
150. NARRAGANSETf TIMES, Dec. I, 1983, at I, col. 4.
151. South Kingstown Zoning Amendment January 1984. See Article 2, 220 
Schedule of District Regulations-Uses and Districts, Single Family Detached Dwelling;
and Article 5, 512 - Special Exception in HFD Zoning Districts and Behind the Foredune
Zone: "The foredune line is an area extending from the spring highwater line (SHW) land
ward to the back barrier flat. . . The board may grant special exceptions for uses or struc
tures in HFD zoning districts for construction behind the foredune zone as specifically
allowed in this ordinance . . . "
152. Id. Article 5, 513 - Conditions Imposed on Special Exception in HFD Zoning
Districts and Behind the Foredune Zone.
153. Id. Article 5, 512:
The board may require that in addition to the information required for a
building permit that the applicant submit further information to include, but not
be limited to, the following:
A. A map, in duplicate, drawn to scale, showing high and low tide levels, line of
mean high water mark, dimensions of the lot, existing structures and uses on
the lot and adjacent lots, soil type, dunes and natural protective barriers,
existing flood control and erosion control works, existing drainage elevations
and contours of the ground including branch elevations, location and eleva
tion of existing streets, water supply and sanitary facilities, and other perti
nent information.
B. A plan showing the dimensions, elevation, and nature of the proposed use;
amount, area, and type of proposed fill; area and nature of proposed grading
or dredging; proposed alteration of dunes, beaches, or other natural protec
tive barriers; proposed roads, sewers, water, and other utilities; specifications
for building construction and material including flood-proofing.
154. Id.
C. Requirements of Environmental Impact Statement (EIS).
Prior to the granting of a special exception for any use within the HFD zon
ing district or behind the foredune zone, an Environmental Impact State
ment (EIS) shall be filed with the application for the special exception. It is
148.
149.
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foredune zone or the Coastal Resources Management Council's criti
cal erosion area setback line. ISS New maps in the Tax Assessor's office
reflect the changes. The town has established a formidable array of
requirements, far from the solutions posed in French IS6 involving gen
eral taxation, assessments for the public benefit, and other devices to
ensure rudimentary fairness in the allocation of economic burdens.
The history of debate over Green Hill Beach was undoubtedly
well known in our smallest state. The court construed the zoning or
dinance in Annicelli as an attempt to preserve an area in its natural
and beautiful state. 157 The court saw that Mrs. Annicelli had never
had any opportunity to use or enjoy her small plot of ground.
IV.

CONCLUSION

For eight years the courts did not answer the question of whether
the Annicellis could build a vacation home on their oceanfront land.
The amount of compensation was decided quickly, but provides little
guidance for anyone else.
The new zoning amendments attempt to eliminate further com
pensation damages. If they are challenged, claimants can point to
prior decisions which showed a town was trying to preserve a barrier
beach for enhancement of the environment by heavily restricting its
found that the complexity and diversity of the natural environment within
the HFD zoning district and foredune zone necessitates a detailed statement
on anticipated alterations thereto in order to carry out the intent and provi
sions of this ordinance. The requirement for an Environmental Impact
Statement shall be in addition to any other requirement provided by any
other portion of this ordinance. (Special inclusions omitted).
Upon receipt of such an Environmental Impact Statement, the Zoning Board
shall refer same to the Planning Board and Conservation Commission for an
advisory opinion thereon. The Planning Board and Conservation Commis
sion shall each submit a written report to the Zoning Board within forty-five
(45) days of filing of the Environmental Impact Statement with the Zoning
Board.
Where necessary the board may transmit the information described previ
ously to a designated engineer or other expert person or agency for technical
assistance in evaluating the proposed project in relation to flood heights and
velocities, threatened erosion or wave action, the adequacy of the plans for
flood and erosion protection and the adequacy of drainage facilities, and
other technical matters.
155. Id. Article 5, § 513: "Structures shall be constructed landward of the foredune
zone or landward of the CRMC critical erosion area setback line (§ l4O(c»), whichever is
greater."
156. French, 39 N.Y.2d at 599-600, 350 N.E.2d at 389. The New York court did not
see a solution in drafting tighter measures.
157. _ R.I. at - ' 463 A.2d at 141.
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use, and to decisions that appeal to a right for some beneficial use of
their land.
South Kingstown has "retrenched." A soil impact study can be
very costly,158 and its requirement, therefore, is burdensome. The po
sition of the Coastal Management Resources Council will enter into
future decisions. Time will tell whether the courts will hold the new
ordinance constitutional or the special exception illusory. Annicelli
constitutes no clear victory for landowners. A new battle with new
weapons faces other landowners.
Pauline W. Kozuch

158. Kopetzke v. County of San Mateo, Bd. of Super., 396 F.Supp. 1004. Estimates
were $15,000 for land worth that much in 1975. See also, footnote 74.

